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Local demographic entrapment has been discussed informally for many years, but is taboo to the UN
agencies and to much of academia. There are also indications that the world as a whole may be
demographically trapped in that global per capita grain production is falling. Arguments for and against
recognizing entrapment are discussed. Policy implications of entrapment are outlined in the light of the
1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). The case for a one-child world is
argued. Carrying capacity, disentrapment, the two-child paradigm, abortion, Rwanda and North/South
tensions are considered.
Background
Policies in any field are largely set by 'the current
paradigm' - the generally accepted view at the
time. In international public health and family
planning, this view is that, if all the unmet need
for family planning is eventually met, and a two-
child norm ultimately achieved, this will be
demographically sufficient, and no account need
be taken of carrying capacity limitations or of
entrapment meanwhile. This paradigm is so all-
pervading, and any alternatives to it are so
unperceived that it does not even seem to need a
name, in that the term 'two-child paradigm' is
not to be found in the POPLINE database.
There was not a hint of any departure from it at
the Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD) in Cairo in 1994. Has the time come to
question it locally and globally?
A notable feature of medicine since the 1950s has
been the rise and fall of a succession of program-
mes like 'waves on the public health ocean'.
Which waves are now missing or are seriously
weak? What force could drive them, and what
policies should follow from them? Two pro-
grammes now need to be tidal waves driven by an
earthquake. They are those for the control of
population in the South, and for a sustainable
lifestyle in the North. The average Northerner
currently lives at the rate of 7.5 kw of mostly
fossil energy for all purposes, 50 times more than
in the South,1 and by converting it to carbon
dioxide contributes disproportionately to the
greenhouse effect that already appears to be
changing the climate of the world. Equity, the
welfare of mankind, and the stewardship of the
earth require that these programmes be linked.
There is much good population news. Fertility
has fallen rapidly in parts of Asia and Latin
America and spectacularly in China and In-
donesia. It can fall without much socioeconomic
development, as in Bangladesh. There are even
the possible beginnings of a demographic transi-
tion in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.2 There has
been a slowdown in the rate of increase of world
population from 2.1% in 1970 to 1.8% in 1977.
The bad news is that the rate of increase has vir-
tually plateaued since 1980, in that it only fell
0.1% in the 16 years to 1993. Moreover, the
annual increment, presently about 94 million
people a year, is still rising, and will persist at
more than 80 million people annually until at
least 2025, with the result that the world's
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population is projected to reach 10-11 billion
(UN medium variant) at the end of the next
century.3
Can 11 billion people be fed?
No phase in human history lasts indefinitely.
This is likely to include the phase of massive in-
crease in food production that has resulted from
the application of science to agriculture. We can-
not rely on an unlimited series of advances of the
magnitude of the Haber-Bosch process for Fixing
nitrogen, which is now responsible for a third of
all the protein-nitrogen we eat.4 The flow of new
yield-raising agricultural technologies has not
run dry, but it has slowed to a trickle.3 There are
no new technologies in prospect which suggest
that farmers can restore the 3% increase in
global grain production that took place annually
from 1950 to 1984.5 Water is a greater constraint
than arable land per capita, which is falling 1.9%
annually. The response of crops to additional
fertiliser and its global use are also falling.5 Half
a billion people are already farming on hill-sides
that are subject to serious erosion.6 By the end of
this decade more than half of the developing
countries may be unable to feed themselves from
their own lands.7
There must be some upper limit to the food that
the world can produce. If so the curve for the
food it produces must initially be sigmoid (this
does not preclude the possibility of a subsequent
fall). In deciding where the upper limit might be
we should remind ourselves that we shall have to
eat what the world will produce, with all our
shortcomings and the limited advances of
science, not what it could produce without our
failings, and supported by an unlimited series of
scientific breakthroughs. The trend of the curve
for global food is therefore critical, and par-
ticularly any signs of a fall-off in its rate of in-
crease, indicating that we are reaching the upper
inflection of the sigma.
So how can global food be measured? There are
three imperfect and sometimes conflicting
indices:
(1) FAO's index of food production. This was
used by UNFPA3 to reassure the Cairo con-
ference that '. . . During the past 10 years the
world's food production has increased by 24%,
outpacing the rate of population growth . . .'8
(about 18%). For a base year this index takes the
volumes of all foods produced (excluding seed,
animal feed, and non-nutrients such as coffee),
multiplies these by their local prices, and obtains
a product in terms of money. It then takes the
volumes of the foods produced in a subsequent
year, multiplies these volumes by the prices in the
base year (to correct for inflation), and compares
this product, as a percentage, with the product
obtained for the base year. The result of ag-
gregating all the money spent on food and seeing
how this changes over time is that the more ex-
pensive foods eaten by the rich get dispropor-
tionate weighting, compared to the cheap staples
that feed the poor. The money spent on them
also increases disproportionately as the rich get
richer. This index becomes less reliable as the
subsequent year and the base year become fur-
ther apart, and has little validity after 10 years,
so it cannot be reliably plotted continuously.
(2) Dietary energy supply for all foods (DES).
This aggregates all calories consumed and is
more meaningful, but is not available on a global
basis.
(3) Total grain produced globally. Grain supplies
about half the world's dietary energy, is par-
ticularly the food of the poor, and is much the
most practical way in which food can be stored
and transported, especially as food aid. Grain is
thus the most practical indicator; several other
basic foods follow similar or less favourable per
capita trends (seafood, beef, mutton, etc.).3
Although root crops, particularly cassava, are
important in many areas, and have done much to
increase carrying capacity and tide communities
through famines, they cannot easily be trans-
ported round the world, or stored many months
in a silo.
Global grain production is therefore critical. The
key question is: Have we already reached the up-
per inflection of the sigmoid global grain curve?
If total grain shows signs of plateauing, but
population does not, per capita grain will start
falling. Is this already happening? Brown (1994)
reports that per capita grain has indeed fallen
12% since 1984, and finds that over the last 10
years the average annual increment in global
grain has been 12 million tonnes.5 At Chinese
levels (three people to the tonne) this only feeds
36 million additional people. FAO (1994) also
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confirms a recent per capita fall, but finds the
10-year annual increment to have been 22 million
tonnes (food for 66 million people).9 Even the
most hopeful interpretation of existing trends is
far from encouraging: 'The production data for
the last two years are preliminary, but if they
turn out to be correct, and if grain production
continues to fall below that of the early 1990s,
then we shall soon be on a statistically significant
downward trend of grain production per
person'.10
Although the recent fall in global per capita grain
production is generally accepted, its significance
is disputed," since it may be due to the fall in
grain price resulting from common market agri-
cultural policies, which may have reduced the
area under grain elsewhere, particularly setaside
land in North America. There is also the possible
switch of land from grain to other crops. We
argue that if setaside land, which is generally
marginal, had to be used to reach the 1984 max-
imum in per capita grain, this is as significant for
long-term global food security as falling per
capita grain would be without setaside. The
medium term outlook is not reassuring. In 1990
the world grew 1.9 Mt of grain. By 2020, only
half a lifetime away, it is expected to need 2.9
Mt, or half as much again." It is expected that
'. . . food demands for the next 30 years will
mostly [our italics] be met . . . '" which is also to
expect that they will partly not be met. Nobody
knows how large the shortfall could be. What the
long-term sustainability of grain production
might be is even less certain. A major risk is that
due to the increasing variability of grain produc-
tion in North America, it may experience two
bad years in succession. If Africa, where harvests
are also becoming increasingly variable, also has
a bad year, the situation could be serious.
Since people must eat, the curve for global
population must be sigmoid also, but it need not
follow that for grain exactly, because grain con-
sumption can vary by a factor of four, and
ranges from 200 kg annually in India, to 800 kg
in the United States where much grain is fed to
animals first.3 Distribution is therefore critical.
Although enough calories and protein are
already produced to feed 10 billion people on a
vegetarian diet,12 ' ... it seems unlikely that those
who can eat meat will forgo the opportunity to
do so; instead they will be joined by hundreds of
millions who will be able to act on their
preference for meat in their diet . . . '" The pros-
pects for redistributing food by a global shift
towards a vegetarian diet do not seem good. To
those who argue that there is 'slack in the food
system'4 in the same sense that there was the
slack in the energy system prior to the oil price
rise of the 1970s, we point out that, unlike the
energy system where it was in the interests of all
users to economize, the slack is mostly in the rich
part of the food system whereas the hungry are in
the poor part. There is thus less incentive to take
up and distribute the slack.
If falling per capita grain really does imply a
deteriorating global food situation, every extra
person now means less food for someone else,
yet world population is set to double, and about
a fifth of the people in the developing world were
already chronically undernourished in 1990.14
The magnitude of the shortfall is not easily com-
prehended - population growth is now such that
to feed every day's increment requires an addi-
tional 80 000 tonnes of grain a year, continued
indefinitely. Of each new conception we now
need to ask: How likely is it that the earth will
produce the 25 tonnes of grain that this new life
is going to need?
The fact that grain prices have fallen in real
terms over the last decade should be no cause for
complacency, sinced the hungry poor cannot pay
more for their grain, nor can they sustain the
price rise that might increase output. Yet without
such a price rise, peasant farmers, as in Zambia
at the present time, cannot afford the fertilizer
and other inputs that might increase production.
Will the rich be prepared to subsidize the
necessary agricultural inputs and be willing to
pay more for the grain they supply as food aid?
Where are sub-Saharan Africa and Bangladesh
to get the foreign exchange they will need to
import grain which seems likely to become
increasingly expensive?
The plight of particular communities
Whatever may be the prospects for the world as a
whole, the prospects for some individual com-
munities are dire. For many years aid agency
executives have been referring informally to a
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condition termed 'demographic entrapment'.
This condition has recently been defined.15 Here
is that definition slightly modified by recent
events in Rwanda.
A local population is demographically trapped if
it has exceeded, or is projected to exceed the
combination of: (a) the carrying capacity of its
own ecosystem, (b) its ability to obtain the pro-
ducts, and particularly the food, produced by
other ecosystems except as food aid, and (c) its
ability to migrate to other ecosystems in a man-
ner which preserves (or improves) its standard of
living (upmigration). Items (b) and (c) describe
the links that a population has with other
ecosystems, and are crucial, so they are most
easily thought of as 'connectedness' and its
opposite 'disconnectedness'.
A severely trapped population faces the five
alternatives of entrapment in varying combina-
tion. Depending on local cultural, political and
ecological factors it can: (1) become progres-
sively stunted, and/or starve; (2) die from
disease; (3) slaughter itself or its neighbours; (4)
migrate in misery to a refugee camp or urban
slum (downmigration); (5) be supported in-
definitely by food aid (if food is available).
Whether a population stunts and starves, or if
and when slaughter breaks out, is likely to
depend on whether there are severe ethnic or
political rifts in the population already, as
particularly in Rwanda.
Since endangered populations are growing
rapidly, the critical part of the definition is '. . .
is projected to . . .', and concerns the ultimate
size of a population at the end of its demographic
transition when its demographic momentum is
exhausted, in relation to its carrying capacity and
its connectedness. The major constraint is time,
and particularly whether such measures as
female education, etc. have time to bring the
birth rate down before carrying capacity and
connectedness are exceeded. UNICEF's PPE
spiral (poverty, population, environment)
describes an important part of the entrapment
process, but does not go far enough, in that
UNICEF does not recognise entrapment or its
ending in the tragedy of 'the five alternatives',
nor does UNICEF accept the rigour of the steps
that are needed to prevent them.
Do communities defined as trapped by this
definition, actually exist? Before the recent
tragedy in Rwanda it was easier to argue that
they did not. Rwanda was already high on the list
of the presumably trapped countries15 before the
present tragedy. Some observers had been ex-
pecting disaster there any day. Rwanda is one of
the most densely populated countries in Africa,
and has the highest total fertility in the world,
8.5 children per woman. Population pressure is
intense with many families on only half a hectare
and much malnutrition. In the 1970s its carrying
capacity was estimated to be 6-7 million. In
1994, when its population had reached 7.6
million, the genocide endemic in the region
suddenly escalated by an order of magnitude.
Although the human rights movement has
argued that population pressure is a myth in
Rwanda, we argue that it has many links with
factors that exacerbate genocide, both in the
phase in which genocide is planned, and in the
phase in which it runs wild in the community.
Once violence begins in an intensely trapped
community, there is a considerable temptation to
slaughter your neighbour, and seize his half hec-
tare before he does the same to you.
Rwanda is bad enough, but how many countries
are due to follow it? No formal study of entrap-
ment has yet been done, so great is the reluctance
to do such a study, to fund it, or to host it, since
it amounts in effect to a diagnosis of which com-
munities are going to face the five alternatives of
entrapment, and when might this happen? There
is however wide informal agreement that parts
of the Indian subcontinent and much of sub-
Saharan Africa are demographically trapped.15
If this is local demographic entrapment, what
then might be global entrapment? Unlike a local
community, the world as a whole is a closed
system, with no extraterrestrial migration, no
exports, no imports except the sun's photons,
and no possibility of food aid. As a definition we
suggest that: 'The world's population is demo-
graphically trapped if it has exceeded or is pro-
jected to exceed the carrying capacity of the
earth, as shown by a falling per capita grain con-
sumption.' This has the virtue of matching the
definition of local entrapment and being based
on per capita grain consumption, the most solid
indicator.
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Should (local) entrapment be
recognized?
Only once has entrapment ever been officially
mentioned by any UN agency.16 It is also taboo
in much of academia. Whether it should be
recognized or not is the major policy decision in
international health at the present time. There
are powerful arguments for and against recogniz-
ing it.
The arguments for recognizing entrapment
• The need to seek and face the truth, North and
South - this is the compelling argument. The
longer we postpone doing this, the more difficult
will it eventually become.
• There is much we can do.
• We should face the subsidiary dilemmas
actively rather than by default, particularly the
conflict between the interests of the foetus (and
the child15) in a severely trapped community, and
those of the community itself. For children this
dilemma is only significant if child mortality is
high. It mainly concerns programme priorities,
and the disposition of new resources.
• We should not keep trapped communities in
ignorance of their plight.
• At the very least the recognition of entrapment
would give a powerful boost to ordinary family
planning (down to a two-child norm).
• Some communities might accept one-child
families. The world has in effect a number of
other 'Chinas', in that they are in the same posi-
tion demographically as China was when it in-
stituted its one-child families, but they don't
recognize their predicament. From a global
perspective, we argue that every community must
do so (see below).
The arguments against recognizing entrapment
• The trapped poor might be unduly coerced to
restrict their fertility by their own elites. One of
the major weaknesses of the two-child paradigm
is that it takes human rights as an absolute
'given', and denies that the ecological constraints
upon humans of population, territory and food,
etc. influence these rights in any way. The reality
is that our rights and ethics have to fit in with
ecology, since it will not fit in with us. It is not
that we don't have any rights, but that such
rights as we do have must take ecology as a
'given', and not vice versa - as at present. Which
coercions are justified? There are some
practices (torture, for example) which must be
considered ethically unacceptable in all societies.
There are, however, other practices (incentives
and penalties relating to abortion), which may be
justified in a trapped community faced with the
dilemma of aborted foetuses or starving adults,
but which are not justified in a non-trapped one
which does not face this dilemma. Just which in-
centives and which penalties are justified in a
trapped community in the support of abortion
now needs urgent discussion. We should be
cautious in critizing the ethics of a trapped com-
munity from the perspective of a non-trapped
one.
• We cannot forecast the future. There is
nothing we can do, in that we are powerless to
alter the development dynamic in the South, or
to adequately assist it to control its fertility, nor
can we reduce resource consumption and pollu-
tion by the North (in effect fatalism).
• To admit the existence of entrapment is to
break a taboo. Unfortunately, taboos may be
necessary for the stability of a society in ways
which may not always be immediately apparent.
Here the taboo seems necessary for relieving our
anxiety, for preserving our comforting short-
term view of the world, for the present relative
stability of North-South relations, and for main-
taining the current paradigm in public health.
• Finally, there are the tensions that could be
liberated by discussing entrapment.
Two issues are particularly important for policy:
Should communities be faced with the dilemma:
If you don't radically limit your fertility, if
necessary to one child, you can expect to starve?
President Chiluba of Zambia was recently asked
about the size of his family. He replied: 'I am
just like any African, I have nine children."7 In
neighbouring Malawi, where 56% of the farms
already have a mean size of only 0.55 hectare,
total fertility is 7.6.l8 The World Bank estimates
that, if current food production and growth
trends continue,19 the food shortage for Africa
will amount to 250 million tonnes of grain by
2020, or 20 times its current food gap. This is
more than all the grain currently traded on the
international market (about 200 million tonnes).
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Hopefully, present trends will not continue.20
Since they might, the questions which now have
to be asked are: 'Should, and can, the rest of the
world guarantee to feed Africa indefinitely if its
present fertility pattern continues?' Has the time
come to face presidents and communities with
the situation: If you don't reduce your fertility
radically, if necessary to one-child, you may be
faced with the five alternatives of entrapment?
We think it has. Urgent studies of carrying
capacity and entrapment are required. They are
likely to be disturbing and to present local
decision-makers with the dilemma: should
policies and plans be set by what should happen
in a perfectly equitable world, or by what will
probably happen in our present inequitable one?
Hopefully, there will be some shift towards
equity, but probably not enough.
Are the tensions that might be liberated by the
discussion of entrapment to be welcomed?
The tensions liberated by discussing 'Who is
going to starve while we have plenty to eat?'
might be severe. If entrapment is recognized,
powerful forces could be released, with no telling
what the end result might be. However, these
forces appear to be the only ones that might
possibly produce the earthquake that the world
requires, as the ideological tectonic plates that
support North and South grind and shudder
against one another to propel the necessary tidal
waves in our lifestyle and our reproduction. The
hope must be that the energies so liberated can be
channelled constructively to produce the changes
that the world so badly needs. The danger is that
they might be destructive. Persisting with the
status quo is however likely to be worse, with
more ecological destruction, more global warm-
ing, and more strife and starvation. Paradoxi-
cally therefore, the release of these tensions, if
indeed they can be released, is an excellent reason
for recognizing entrapment.
How violent these tensions will actually be
remains to be seen. They might be weaker than
expected, since the world appears to be moving
from a North/South polarity towards a rich/
poor one, in which Southern elites who are not
trapped, since they are able to migrate whereas
the poor cannot, side with the North. Because
the trapped poor are powerless, and are not pre-
sent at international meetings, the release of
tensions may be moderated. Thus Nafis Sadik,
Executive Director of UNFPA, who is from
Pakistan which is presumptively trapped, and
who is well aware of entrapment, chose not to
discuss it in Cairo. Of 43 Zambian post-
graduates, mostly PhDs, recently interviewed in
Cambridge, none intended returning to Zambia.
Instead of the creative furore of North grinding
against South, there may instead be a silent
squelch as the rich slide over the poor.
Vigorous or not, we welcome the release of the
tensions that the recognition of entrapment
might produce, as being the only forces which
might possibly induce the North to reduce its
resource consumption and pollution, and the
South its fertility. These changes are linked, in
that neither the North nor the South can do what
the other must do. Much depends on the
rationality of both North and South, and what
sense of equity, if any, there is in the North.
A missed opportunity - the 'Declaration
of Cairo for a one-child world'
Adherence to the two-child paradigm was un-
questioned in Cairo. Privately however, many
aid agency executives and academics have no
illusions about its weakness. The result is an in-
creasing degree of doublethink13 as official and
unofficial views of reality drift progressively
further apart.
If, following Brown, the current annual grain in-
crement really is only 12 million tonnes of grain,
feeding 36 million people, this calls for a one-
child world - if per capita grain is not to continue
to fall. A two-child world would produce an
annual increment of 50 million people between
now and 2030.21 FAO's estimate of a 22 million
tonne annual increment would, however, feed 66
million people and suffice for an instant two-
child world. Estimates of the current per capita
grain increment, the reasons for its fall, and pro-
jections of what it will do in future, are so varied
that it would be politically impracticable for a
global one-child policy to be based on this data
alone. Nevertheless, in the face of any uncer-
tainty over future global grain and its redistribu-
tion, it is better to be safe than sorry. The most
powerful argument for a one-child world is,
however, that, if local communities need one-
child families to avoid starvation or the other
alternatives of entrapment, the rest of the world
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should, in the interests of equity do the same,
particularly since the average British family,
for example, consumes resources and pollutes at
a rate equivalent to 15-25 average global
families.22 If other communities opt in-
dependently for one-child families, as did China,
that is their decision, but if we counsel com-
munities to have one-child families, we must in
the interests of equity, also have them ourselves,
or drastically cut our consumption of non-
renewable resources.
Some of us have argued23 that the ICPD should
have produced a 'Declaration of Cairo for a one-
child world' - less as a specific target than what
WHO's previous director general, Halfdan
Mahler, would have called 'a political direction'
in the manner of 'Primary Health Care', or
'Health for all for the World 2000'. It seems
likely that history will consider this to have been
a lost opportunity.
In the event, the programme for Cairo was set at
preparatory conferences long before. These
followed the current two-child paradigm and
took no account of either global food uncertain-
ties, or demographic entrapment. 'A one-child
world' is likely to be an even more urgent policy
option for the next ICPD in 2004. Will the
prevailing paradigm have changed meanwhile?
There are early signs that it is already starting to
do so. Such however is the inertia of opinions,
policies and plans, that this will take some years.
Meanwhile, the global population increases at
10 000 an hour, or more than two billion over the
next two decades, and, for whatever reason, per
capita grain is presently falling.59
If this paper is considered pessimistic, let it be
remembered that we have proposed, hopeful,
courageous, and far-reaching policies. Their
attainment depends on whether we really want
these changes, or whether we would actually
prefer the status quo. We suggest that there may
be a case for opening up the dialogue on the
faults in the two-child paradigm, no matter how
firmly entrenched it appears to be.
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